////This is the text from a presentation given by Denish Jaswal at the Saint Louis Uni. Philosophy Club's Undergraduate Speaker's Conference I posted about recently (the text of my presentation can be found here). Denish has generously given permission to reproduce this on the blog - she is a Neuroscience/Philosophy student and the organiser of the SLU Philosophy Club.
Do You See What I See?
Integrating Hallucinogenic Drug Effects with Haack’s Foundherentism
Abstract: In
this paper, I argue that the organizational cognitive concepts that provide
structure for visual perception can be systemized in a hierarchal model based
on the invariance of these concepts when perception is altered by
hallucinogenic psychoactive drugs. This thesis will be supported by first
explaining the basics of the normal visual perception model in current
neurobiology. This will be followed by a brief summary of the state of visual
perception as altered by psychoactive hallucinogenic drugs. Following this
discussion, I will present Susan Haack’s hierarchal model of credible truths
contained in her theory of foundherentism. From foundherentism, I will utilize
the ideas of invariance theory (delineated by Jim Woodward) to establish my
thesis which states that the cognitive concepts that confer the most invariance
will be higher on Haack’s established hierarchy. This paper works to integrate
neuroscientific research with epistemic philosophy such that: 1) Haack’s
hierarchal theory is supported by scientific data; 2) this data provides a
tentative hypothesis of the specific ordering of her hierarchy; and 3) Haack’s
hierarchy can be utilized to provide a potential explanation of the stability
of certain cognitive concepts when the brain is influenced by hallucinogenic
psychoactive drugs.
Section 1: Introduction
Relatively
little work has been done to combine neurobiological findings with theories in
epistemology. It is through the integration of scientific and philosophical
disciplines that further progress can be made in attempting to understand how
our brains and minds work. As such, in this paper I will attempt to cohere the
scientific studies of the effects hallucinogenic drug use has upon the brain
with philosophical models of justified knowledge. The differences in
organizational cognitive concepts, or schemata, that provide structure for
visual perception can be organized in a hierarchal model based on the
invariance of these concepts when perception is altered by hallucinogenic
psychoactive drugs. That is to say that the organizing schemata we use to orient
ourselves in reality—like time, spatial dimensions, and distinctions between
self and objects—can placed higher or lower on a hierarchy of knowledge based
on how unchanging these schematas are when stressed by hallucinogens. This
hierarchal model is based in Susan Haack’s theory of justification,
foundherentism, lending neurobiological evidence to provide a new basis for her
conclusions about credible truths. In this paper, I will work to integrate
neurobiological research with epistemic philosophy to achieve 3 main goals: 1)
Haack’s hierarchal theory is supported by scientific data; 2) this data
provides a tentative hypothesis of the specific ordering of her hierarchy; and
3) Haack’s hierarchy can be utilized to provide a potential explanation of the
stability of certain schemata when the brain is influenced by hallucinogenic
psychoactive drugs.
I will
support the thesis of this paper by first examining the regions of visual
perception implicated by hallucinogens in current neurobiology. This will be
followed by a specific look into the state of visual perception as altered by
psychoactive hallucinogenic drugs. Following this discussion, I will move to
present Susan Haack’s hierarchal model of credible truths contained in her idea
of foundherentism. From foundherentism, I will utilize the ideas of invariance
theory (delineated by Jim Woodward) to support my thesis that the cognitive
concepts that confer the most amount of invariance will lead to a higher
stature on Haack’s hierarchy.
Section 2: Basic Neurobiology
of Visual Perception
Stephen
Kosslyn and Oliver Koenig’s book, Wet
Mind: The New Cognitive Neuroscience, defines visual perception as the
cognitive process in which stored memories are brought to bear upon a current
physical stimulus for the sake of answering a question about its nature. Visual
perception is a higher level Function of the brain that is reliant upon smaller
functions the brain carries out. These smaller level functions are organized
into various subsystems that perform specialized tasks correlating with
specific parts of the brain (Kosslyn and Koenig). Although it is beyond the
scope of this paper to completely delineate the research of Kosslyn and
Koening, for the purposes of this paper, we can state that two subsystems, the preprocessing
and long-term memory subsystems, implicate the same brain structures that
hallucinogenic drugs act upon. Through neuroimaging studies, it has been shown
that the preprocessing systems are controlled by the temporal gyrus, inferior
temporal gyrus, and fusiform gyrus of the prefrontal cortex (Sergent et al.).
Long-term memory, in contrast, is stored in many different regions of the
brain, a representation that is called multimodal. Even though this is so,
researchers have been able to determine that much of long-term associative
memory that has to do with the visual processing system relies on the function
of the angular gyrus in the cortex (Kosslyn et al.). Hallucinogens, as I will
prove in further detail in the next section, effect the same neurobiology (the
gyrus) that is implicated in our mechanism of visual perception.
Section 3: Visual Perception as
Altered by Psychoactive Hallucinogenic Drugs
Section 3.1: Defining Hallucinogens
Hallucinogenic
drugs have been used throughout time to provide humans with an altered state of
consciousness, from simplistic plant forms to their in vogue existence as
capsules. Researchers clearly define a psychoactive hallucinogenic drug as “any
agent that causes alterations in perception, cognition, and mood as its primary
psychobiological actions in the presence of an otherwise clear sensorium” (H.D.
Abraham et al. 277). Hallucinogens are different than other psychoactive drugs
(e.g. stimulants, opioids) because their effects are primarily characteristic
of visual alterations. Hallucinogens are broken up into 3 major categories:
Psychedelics, Dissociatives, and Deliriants. Although these classifications
join the general features of these drugs, several hallucinogens confer varying
effects because they commonly act upon more than one neurobiological receptor
(“Hallucinogens”). However, this tri-tiered classification system is the
primary mode of taxonomical organization in pharmacore and medicinal chemistry.
Section
3.2: Neurobiological Mechanism of Psychedelic Hallucinogens
Many hallucinogens have chemical structures similar to
those of neurotransmitters found naturally in humans and are temporarily able
to modify the action of those neurotransmitters and/or receptor sites
(Stafford). It is, again, beyond the scope of this paper to delineate the
precise mechanisms of every hallucinogenic drug, but I will describe the basic
affected regions of several critical hallucinogens. For instance, the effects
of serotonergic psychedelics— including LSD, psilocybin, and mescaline—are most
directly related to the neurobiological systems of visual processing. Serotonin is a naturally occurring monoamine
neurotransmitter that is tied to positive mood, appetite, sleep, memory,
learning, and a vast repertoire of other functions. Serotonergic psychedelics
have strong structural similarities to serotonin, which explains their
substitution for serotonin in certain receptors (Nichols). Although research
into how these actions produce the psychedelic experience is yet unclear, it is
known that much of their prominent action occurs in the prefrontal cortex
(Carhart-Harris et. al). The prefrontal cortex contains the superior, middle,
and inferior frontal gyrus which were implicated in the preprocessing subsystem
as well as the long-term memory subsystems previously discussed in the
neurobiology of visual perception. Thus,
it follows that our visual perception is altered when under the influence of
hallucinogens. Since this is so, we will be able to use the differences observed
in visual perception when stressed by hallucinogens to constitute the hierarchy
of schematas central to the thesis of this paper.
Section 3.3. Hallucinogenic Alteration of Visual
Perception
When
the brain is introduced to hallucinogenic drugs, neurobiologically, visual
perception is altered through the methods described previously. When translated
into less scientific and more generic terms, hallucinogenic drug use is
characterized by its general modification of several typical organizational
cognitive conceptions/schemata like the progression of time, spatial
orientation/relationships, and sense of self/egoism, among others. A study of
psilocybin showed that its influence over cognitive processes led to these
effects, among others (Studerus et al.). Although hallucinogens can create
hallucinations, and this kind of effect is stereotypical of hallucinogens,
another study argued that hallucinations are not typically the case unless drug
use is especially frequent (H.D. Abraham et al.). For the most part, the world
remains the same under the influence, but we
are changed. Aldous Huxley, the mastermind behind Brave New World, was
especially fascinated by hallucinogens, and actually offered to experiment with
mescaline so that a psychologist could observe him. He also wrote a short paper
on his experience, entitled “Doors of Perception,” explaining that, “The other
world to which mescalin admitted me was not the world of visions; it existed
out there, in what I could see with my eyes open” (4). From this, we can
conclude that under the influence of hallucinogens, the schemata that we
interpret reality with in a sober way of mind are altered in a way that our
mind is unaccustomed to. However, there is no new introduction of schemata;
pre-existing schemata are simply changed.
Section 4: Establishing
Foundherentism
In her
book, Evidence and Inquiry: Towards
Reconstruction in Epistemology, Susan Haack presents her idea of
foundherentism. Stemming from a criticism of her foundationalist and
coherentist predecessors, Haack attempts to create
a system of justification that melds together elements of both of these
theories in order to yield a more accurate picture of what a justified belief
truly is. She is especially interested in creating epistemic hierarchies of schemata,
giving a nice relationship between the neurobiology we discussed, as it detects
differences in schemata via visual perception changes.
Her
idea works as follows: She states that it is possible to include the relevance
of experience in the weighting of the justification of empirical beliefs (an
element of foundationalism) with a system of mutually supportive statements (an
element of coherentism). For instance, if statement A is supported by
experiential claim B and C and then claim B is supported in turn by A and D,
then an interdependent system is formed that still makes room for experiential
evidence to support claims. She thinks of her theory like a crossword puzzle. A
crossword puzzle confers mutual support among crossword entries (like coherentism),
but still rests on some basis of hints that let one determine what the word is
to be. These clues are analogous to a person’s experiential evidence (like
foundationalism) and the intersecting entries that have been previously
completed are analogous to the substantiated reasons for a belief (Haack).
Within
this system of interdependent beliefs, a hierarchy is created that grants
certain beliefs more credibility than others. If certain beliefs are supported
by more beliefs than others (in number and source material), then they are
likely to be more credible than others (Haack). For instance, the theory of
gravity is more credible than the theory of the Higgs-Boson God particle. The
theory of gravity has much more experiential, interlocking evidentiary support
that increases its degree of credibility in comparison to the newer, latter
theory of physics. Haack, if she used this example, would argue that the
Higgs-Boson theory has fewer supporting claims that lend to its credibility.
This leads it to be lower on a hierarchy of principles governing the physics of
the world. Thus, Haack creates a hierarchy of epistemically justified beliefs
resting upon her idea of foundherentism.
Section 5: Invariance Theory
Relates Hallucinogenic Drug Effects to Haack’s Hierarchy
Section 5.1: Woodward’s Invariance Theory
In his paper, “Explanation, Invariance, and
Intervention,” Jim Woodward explicates the notion of invariance. Though this is
commonly held as a mathematical principle, Woodward applies the theory to the philosophy
of science as a method to confer epistemic justification for certain truth
claims. He states,
A
generalization that continues to hold or is stable…under some class of
interventions that change the conditions described in its antecedent and that
tells us how the conditions described in its consequent would change in
response to these interventions is invariant under such interventions.
Invariance thus requires stability under interventions although invariant
generalizations will virtually always be invariant under changes that are not
interventions as well. (31-32)
Thus, invariance is the ability for a concept or notion
to remain consistent when under normal conditions and under certain types of
stress. Invariant concepts do not change. Although the invariance of an idea
exists when the idea is not under stress, invariance can be determined when a
concept is put through stress. Stress tests an idea’s invariance, and
determines whether or not it is a truly invariant concept.
Section 5.2: Hallucinogenic Invariance and Haack’s
Hierarchy
In Haack’s hierarchy, some truths confer higher
credibility than others based upon the degree of mutual support garnered from
other truths. The more truths one can utilize to support another truth, the
more credible the latter truth becomes. Thus, a hierarchy is created which
places truths with more mutual support stemming from other truths at the top
and truths with little support from other truths at the bottom (Haack). In this
manner, the hierarchy correlates with the theory of invariance. The higher up
on the hierarchy a truth-claim is, the less likely it is to be refuted because
of its vast network of supporting truth claims. The ability for a truth-claim
to withstand stresses from other truth-claims is more likely if the tested
truth-claim is more stable to begin with, as are the truth claims at the top of
the hierarchy. It can thus be stated that the truths at the peak of Haack’s
hierarchy possess a greater degree of invariance than other truths lower on the
pyramid. Thus, the credible claims in Haack’s model can be said to possess a
high degree of invariance.
Section 5.3. Invariance Theory and the Effects of
Hallucinogenic Drugs
Varying
degrees of invariance also present when analyzing cognitive concepts under the
neurological stress of hallucinogenic drugs. As has been discussed, schematas
such as the progression of time, spatial orientation/relationships, and sense
of self/egoism are vastly altered under the influence of hallucinogens. Time
appears to slow down and speed up, objects seem nearer and farther away, and
the self can be either vastly depersonalized or brought into jarring focus
(Studerus et al.). When relating these alterations to the theory of invariance,
because alterations of these specific schemata occur given neurological stress,
these schemata are not invariants.
Although
these specific schemata are altered, others remain the same. For example,
objects in front of a person remain identifiable as that object. Modulations do
occur in terms of certain characteristics that the object in question contains,
but the object is still visually identified as the same object in both sober
and hallucinogenic thought. You can still differentiate between a cat and a
piano and identify each as such. The larger relation between mind and the world
order also remains relatively invariant. Though certain features about reality
around a person are accentuated and distorted, the essential existence of
reality and surrounding objects remains consistent. This is especially clear
through a study of psilocybin which stated that “reality testing remained
intact, and most subjects sustained critical distance using statements like
(‘it is as if’) to their own subjective experience” (Studerus et al. 13). The
basic relationship between placement in reality and the resultant confirmation
of the existence of this reality remains invariant even though it is modulated
through certain organizational structures like time, space, and ego that help
one orient themselves within this larger context of reality.
It has
thus been established that certain cognitive concepts (object identification
and the relation between the mind and reality) remain relatively invariant
under the impact of hallucinogens while other schematas (like the progression
of time, spatial relations, and the ego) are not invariant. Invariance has also
proven to correlate with a higher placement on Haack’s hierarchy of credible
truths. As such, we can now conclude that the invariant conceptions under
hallucinogenic drug stress should be conceptions that are viewed as more
credible truths than those that are not invariant. This would yield a model
that would place our relationship between mind and the world order as well as
our primary sense of object identification as stronger truth claims than our
concepts of time, self, and spatial relations. As these former concepts retain
invariance even under stress, it follows that they are more stable, more
secure, and thus, more credible.
By
applying the theory of invariance with Haack’s hierarchy to hallucinogenic drug
use, we have accomplished three tasks. First, we have used preexisting
scientific data on hallucinogenic drug effects to support Haack’s hierarchal
theory. Secondly, we have used this data to create a tentative hypothesis of
the ordering of Haack’s hierarchy. Although the ordering based on the
implications of hallucinogens is by no means complete, it still offers some
evidentiary basis for placing one’s relationship between mind and world order
and general object identification above concepts of time, self, and spatial
relations. Third, and perhaps most importantly, we have utilized Haack’s
hierarchy to provide a potential explanation for the stability of certain
cognitive concepts over others when the brain is impacted by hallucinogens.
Several scientific studies exist that aim to explore what different parts of
the brain control and how they act to alter brain function (Stafford) (Studerus
et. al) (Carhart-Harris et. al), but, application of epistemological theories
to explain scientific phenomenon is not common. A scientist alone would likely
never think to delve into epistemology to find a potential explanation for why
certain cognitive concepts are more affected by drugs than others. However, by
taking such an approach, we are able to not only delve into new avenues of
exploration into the sciences, but we can also create a richer field of
epistemology that has applications and impacts across disciplines.
References
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Carhart-Harris,
R. L., D. Erritzoe, T. Williams, J. M. Stone, L. J. Reed, A. Colasanti, R. J.
Tyacke, R. Leech, A. L. Malizia, K. Murphy, P. Hobden, J. Evans, A. Feilding,
R. G. Wise, and D. J. Nutt. "Neural Correlates of the Psychedelic State as
Determined by FMRI Studies with Psilocybin." <i>Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences</i> 109.6 (2012): 2138-143. Web.
Haack, Susan. Evidence
and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology. Oxford, UK: Blackwell,
1993. Print.
"Hallucinogens - LSD, Peyote, Psilocybin, and
PCP." DrugFacts. National
Institute on Drug Abuse, n.d. Web. 08 Dec. 2015.
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Progress of Reasoning." Philosophical
Studies 134.1 (2006): 1-17. Web.
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Thompson, and Nathaniel M. Alpert. "Mental Rotation of Objects versus
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Lewis, Clarence Irving. An
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Schindler, Emmanuelle A.D., Kuldip D. Dave, Elaine M.
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Intervention." Chicago Journals
64.S1 (1997): n. pag. Philosophy of Science Association, Dec. 1997. Web.
Do
You See What I See? Integrating Hallucinogenic Drug Effects with Haack’s
Foundherentism Supplemental Handout
Thesis: The differences in
organization cognitive concepts (referred to as schemata) that provide
structure for visual perception can be organized in a hierarchal model based on
the invariance of these schemata when perception is altered by hallucinogenic
psychoactive drugs.
Argument Structure:
Section 1.
Introduction
-
Thesis (above)
-
3 Main Goals of Paper:
1. Haack’s hierarchal
theory is supported by scientific data
2. This data provides a
tentative hypothesis of the specific ordering of her hierarchy
3. Haack’s hierarchy can
be utilized to provide a potential explanation of the stability of certain
schemata when the brain is influenced by hallucinogenic psychoactive drugs
Section 2.
Basic Neurobiology of Visual
Perception
-
Visual perception: the
cognitive process in which stored memories are brought to bear upon a current
physical stimulus for the sake of answering a question about its nature
(Stephen Kosslyn and Oliver Koenig, Wet
Mind: The New Cognitive Neuroscience)
-
Organized into 6
different subsystems (the visual buffer, the attention window, the
preprocessing subsystem, associative memory, information lookup, and attention
shifting), which work largely independently of one another to perform
specialized tasks critical to visual perception
-
Subsystems implicated by
hallucinogens: preprocessing and associative memory (largely controlled by the
gyrus (temporal, inferior, fusiform))
Section 3.
Visual Perception as
Altered by Psychoactive Hallucinogenic Drugs
3.1
Defining Hallucinogens
-
“Any agent that causes
alterations in perception, cognition, and mood as its primary psychobiological
actions in the presence of an otherwise clear sensorium” (H.D. Abraham et al.
277)
3.2
Neurobiological
Mechanism of Psychedelic Hallucinogens
-
Serotonergic
psychedelics: LSD, psilocybin, mescaline
-
Psychedelic
hallucinogens substitute for serotonin in certain receptors
-
Serotonin is active in
the cerebral cortex, which contains all gyri
implicated by preprocessing and associative memory subsystems
§
Much of prominent action
occurs in the prefrontal cortex, which contains the inferior gyrus most
specifically
3.3
Hallucinogenic
Alteration of Visual Perception
-
The world around us
remains the same, we are changed
-
Schemata used to
interpret reality within a sober way of mind are altered
4
Establishing
Foundherentism
4.1
Foundationalism
-
Haack specifically
argues against the formulation posited by C.I. Lewis, stating that certain
foundational beliefs (stemming from the Given element of experience) are
self-supporting truth-claims which provide a basis for other non-foundational
truth claims
-
3 main critiques:
§
Foundational knowledge
based on the Given is not certain; can be called into question
§
Justification for
beliefs cannot be a one-way avenue; no linear progression of justification +
presuppositions of memory and present resembling past
§
Probability does not
presuppose certainty; foundational knowledge not necessary
4.2
Coherentism
-
Haack doesn’t argue
against a specific author, but the general theory, stating that truth-claims
are justified through their mutual support of one another, creating a structure
of interdependent truth-claims which all cohere with one another
-
Main critique:
unrealistic, a coherentist approach to epistemic justification is not
necessarily tied to accurately representing reality (coherency could trump
reality)
4.3
Foundherentism
-
Can include the
relevance of empirical beliefs (foundationalism) as well as the system of
mutually supportive statements (coherentism) in one epistemic model
- 
“A”
can be an empirical belief, but still form a network of mutually supportive
statements
-
Creates a hierarchy
where some beliefs are more/less credible than others (based on number and
source material)
§ Big Bang theory is more credible than the Steady-State
Universe model in a hierarchy of truth claims in the field of physics
5
Invariance Theory
Relates Hallucinogenic Drug Effects to Haack’s Hierarchy
5.1
Woodward’s Invariance
Theory
-
Invariance: the ability
for a concept to remain consistent when under normal conditions and under
stress; property of unchanging
-
Stress tests an idea’s
invariance
5.2
Hallucinogenic
Invariance and Haack’s Hierarchy
-
Haack’s hierarchy ranks
truth-claims as more/less credible than others
-
The higher up on the
hierarchy, the less likely it will be refuted b/c of vast network of supporting
truth claims
-
Truth-claims higher on
the hierarchy are able to withstand more stresses than truth-claims lower on
the hierarchy (as truth-claims at the top of the hierarchy are more stable to
begin with)
-
Invariance is thus a
property that can be applied to truth-claims at the top of Haack’s hierarchy;
more credible claims confer a high degree of invariance
5.3
Invariance Theory and the
Effects of Hallucinogenic Drugs
-
Hallucinogens alter
schemata like time, spatial orientation, and sense of self; since these
schemata are altered given the neurological stress of hallucinogens, these
schemata are not invariant
-
Schemata like object
identification and the relation between mind and reality are not altered under
the influence of hallucinogens; therefore, these schemata possesses a higher
degree of invariance than other schemata that are altered
5.4
Invariant Schemata Under
Hallucinogens Confer Higher Credibility in Haack’s Hierarchy
-
Invariance = high degree
of credibility in Haack’s hierarchy
-
Object identification
and relation between mind and reality are invariant schemata under stress in
comparison to schemata like time, spatial orientation, and sense of self
-
Thus, object
identification and the relation between mind and reality are more credible
truth-claims under Haack’s model in comparison to other schemata (time, spatial
orientation, sense of self)
